{"id":2547,"date":"2021-08-17T09:05:00","date_gmt":"2021-08-17T14:05:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?p=2547"},"modified":"2024-01-23T17:31:17","modified_gmt":"2024-01-23T23:31:17","slug":"motions-to-bifurcate-procedural-qualified-immunity-for-municipalities","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?p=2547","title":{"rendered":"Motions to Bifurcate: Procedural Qualified Immunity for Municipalities"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/time.com\/6061624\/what-is-qualified-immunity\/\">Qualified immunity<\/a> is getting a lot of well-deserved attention these days. The doctrine protects individual state actors\u2014and by extension, their government employers\u2014from liability when they have violated a constitutional right if that right was not \u201cclearly established in law.\u201d Protests over police brutality and demands for accountability have brought qualified immunity into the public spotlight. These conversations about individual accountability are important. But as necessary as they are, we cannot ignore the legal mechanisms for and barriers to institutional accountability and reform. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.lawfareblog.com\/municipal-liability-police-misconduct-lawsuits\"><em>Monell<\/em> claims<\/a> are the vehicle by which citizens can sue <em>municipalities<\/em> for policies, customs, and practices that cause individual constitutional violations. Plaintiffs will often simultaneously sue officers in their individual capacity for constitutional violations under <a href=\"https:\/\/www.shouselaw.com\/ca\/civil-rights\/1983-lawsuits\/\">Section 1983<\/a> and the municipality under <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/436\/658\/\"><em>Monell<\/em><\/a> for having a practice or custom that caused that violation. But municipalities, wary of the potential effects of an unfavorable court finding on their policies, customs, and practices, frequently seek to avoid litigating the issue altogether using motions to bifurcate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Beyond giving plaintiffs a means to recover damages for their injuries, <em>Monell<\/em> claims play an important role in government accountability. The financial cost of a successful <em>Monell<\/em> claim against a city can motivate a city to reform practices and policies. Even more important, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.westlaw.com\/Document\/Iba2d3850be5711eb9379f12dace6abd9\/View\/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&amp;contextData=(sc.Default)&amp;VR=3.0&amp;RS=cblt1.0\">as some courts have recognized,<\/a> <em>Monell<\/em> claims can actually compel municipalities to reform through non-monetary remedies like consent decrees. They are also important in situations where many plaintiffs have claims of similar constitutional violations against individual officers within the same municipality. A decision against the city on a <em>Monell<\/em> claim in one case can have significant, pro-plaintiff ramifications in other similar cases. If the violation can be traced back to the same pattern, practice, or custom for which the city was found liable in the previous case, the city may be estopped from disputing the new plaintiff\u2019s <em>Monell<\/em> claim. At the very least, there will be a developed record with a legal finding upon which later cases can rely. This reduces costs and time for other plaintiffs who suffer injuries due to the same custom or practice. On the other hand, a finding of an isolated, individual constitutional violation against an individual officer will generally be <a href=\"https:\/\/www.westlaw.com\/Document\/I6ce537855a1111e0af6af9916f973d19\/View\/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&amp;contextData=(sc.Default)&amp;VR=3.0&amp;RS=cblt1.0\">insufficient to establish<\/a> a pattern or practice for future plaintiffs, sometimes even if the same officer is accused of a violation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Bifurcation is a procedural gift to cities, a tool to avoid <em>Monell<\/em> liability. Motions to bifurcate are predicated on <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/rules\/frcp\/rule_42\">Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b)<\/a> which allows courts to separate trials \u201c[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.\u201d Municipalities regularly argue that discovery and trial of a <em>Monell<\/em> issue simultaneous to, for example, an excessive force claim, will result in <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/kitchen-v-burge-2\">unnecessary and costly discovery<\/a> as well as a trial that may confuse and prejudice a jury against the defendants. Instead, they argue, discovery and trial for the individual constitutional violation should proceed, and if that claim is successful, then the plaintiff should file a separate <em>Monell<\/em> claim against the city.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Cities <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/kitchen-v-burge-2\">argue<\/a> that this strategy is best for everyone. Bifurcation saves the plaintiff the cost of engaging in complex discovery, instead simply focusing on the individual violation. And it allows the city to similarly save on costs, while still getting the plaintiff everything they want (at least financially) if they win on the individual claim. Sometimes, the city even agrees to a <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/kitchen-v-burge-2\">partial judgement<\/a> in the event the officer is found liable; they will pay damages equivalent to what the plaintiff would have received had both claims (individual and <em>Monell<\/em>) been successful, and they will do so even if the officer is found to be protected by qualified immunity. This looks like a good deal for all parties involved, a win\u2013win.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>But looks can be deceiving. Financially, for that one plaintiff, the outcome may be the same. But the benefits end there. Unless the plaintiff is willing to pursue another (very costly) lawsuit, the end of the individual suit will probably end all litigation. Most plaintiffs do not have the resources to see two separate lawsuits all the way through. Here\u2019s why that can be a problem: First, it means that there will be no judgement, on the record, against the city as to its patterns and practices causing constitutional violations. The city\u2019s agreement to indemnify and pay up does not include an admission of a pattern and practice under <em>Monell<\/em>. This means other litigants claiming injuries from similar conduct cannot use the indemnification agreement as evidence in their own cases. And second, focusing only on individual claims curbs opportunities for institutional reform. Financial payment may be made, but Section 1983 claims against individual officers cannot be used as a vehicle to force non-monetary damages such as consent decrees and reforms to policing practices and training.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To illustrate the power of bifurcation to protect municipalities against <em>Monell<\/em> claims and accountability, let\u2019s look at the case of <a href=\"https:\/\/chicagotorture.org\/reparations\/history\/\">former<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wbez.org\/stories\/mayor-lori-lightfoot-says-police-tortured-at-least-100-black-chicagoans-the-city-refuses-to-call-it-a-pattern\/7b5eca8c-5089-44a4-9648-6e720e8fb521\">Chicago Police Commander Jon Burge<\/a>. Burge and his subordinates <a href=\"https:\/\/igchicago.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/01\/PATF_Final_Report_4_13_16-1.pdf\">tortured and abused<\/a> over one hundred Black suspects in order to extract confessions. Even Chicago Mayor Lori Lightfoot has acknowledged the abuse. Chicago passed an <a href=\"https:\/\/chicagotorture.org\/reparations\/ordinance\/\">ordinance<\/a> providing reparations to victims of torture and subsequent wrongful convictions. That ordinance included a requirement that Chicago Public School history classes include a unit on Burge and \u201csystemic\u201d torture in the Chicago Police Department. Despite this public recognition, Chicago has refused to acknowledge the torture in a court of law, continuing to argue that it never happened, and characterizing assertions of abuse and torture as \u201cfairy tales.\u201d And the City has never had to admit that the abuse was part of a systemic pattern created by customs and practices within the Chicago Police Department, the standard required for <em>Monell<\/em> claims.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Many of the individuals tortured by Burge and his detectives have been released and granted certificates of innocence. Many have <a href=\"https:\/\/abc7chicago.com\/jackie-wilson-cpd-richard-m-daley-police-torture\/10848100\/\">filed<\/a> civil suits against the individuals responsible for their abuse and coerced confessions and against the City of Chicago for a pattern and practice that caused the violation of constitutional rights. Yet Chicago has regularly used motions to bifurcate to avoid liability on the <em>Monell<\/em> claims. For example, in 2006, the Northern District of Illinois <a href=\"https:\/\/www.westlaw.com\/Document\/Id6e87c30a01111eab2c3c7d85ec85a54\/View\/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&amp;contextData=(sc.Default)&amp;VR=3.0&amp;RS=cblt1.0\">granted<\/a> Chicago\u2019s motion to bifurcate <em>Monell<\/em> claims in the case of Leroy Orange. Orange was convicted of four murders and sentenced to death based solely on his coerced confession; fifteen years later he was granted a full pardon of innocence before filing his civil suit against Burge and Chicago. In granting the City\u2019s motion to bifurcate, the court cited efficiency: the <em>Monell<\/em> case would have included an additional thirty potential witnesses. The City of Chicago also argued that because they were willing to pay all compensatory damages associated with the constitutional violation, there was no need to litigate the burdensome <em>Monell<\/em> claim. Similarly, Ronald Kitchen was convicted and sentenced for the murders of five people based on his coerced confession; in 2012, the Northern District of Illinois <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/kitchen-v-burge-2\">granted<\/a> Chicago\u2019s motion to bifurcate Kitchen\u2019s <em>Monell<\/em> claim in a civil suit against Chicago and individual officers responsible for his coerced confession because \u201cthe burdens and costs of litigating the <em>Monell<\/em> claim can be avoided altogether.\u201d Like the City in Leroy Orange\u2019s civil suit, the court in Ronald Kitchen\u2019s suit focused on monetary outcomes. Because compensation to the plaintiff would be no different with or without the <em>Monell<\/em> claim, the court reasoned, there was no justification for allowing the <em>Monell<\/em> claim to proceed as part of the suit against individual officers. In doing so, the court ignored the value to efficiency that a court ruling, which found that a city&#8217;s customs and practices caused the constitutional violation, could have for the many other plaintiffs with potential claims against Burge and his subordinates.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Notably, judges in the Northern District of Illinois have recently been more hesitant to grant motions to bifurcate in civil suits against the city related to torture and abuse by Burge and his detectives. Just a few months ago, Judge Ellis <a href=\"https:\/\/www.westlaw.com\/Document\/Iba2d3850be5711eb9379f12dace6abd9\/View\/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&amp;contextData=(sc.Default)&amp;VR=3.0&amp;RS=cblt1.0\">denied<\/a> the City\u2019s motion to bifurcate in James Gibson\u2019s civil suit. Gibson was convicted for murder based on coerced statements and spent nearly thirty years in prison before having his conviction overturned and a certificate of innocence granted. But motions to bifurcate are still commonly granted because courts focus on the compensation available to plaintiffs, not acknowledging the power that a finding on <em>Monell<\/em> has in cases with similar constitutional violations within the same municipality and under similar circumstances. If the courts are concerned about costs\u2014both financial and temporal\u2014of litigation, surely the opportunity to delve into the allegations in one case would save future litigants, as well as courts, the cost and time of re-examining those same issues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Monell<\/em> claims are expensive and time-consuming, from discovery to trial. But the procedural barriers like bifurcation that make <em>Monell<\/em> claims even more difficult to establish in a court of law should not be ignored. Procedural rules may seem benign. But bifurcation is, in a way, procedural qualified immunity for cities. For real change in policing, procedural tactics like bifurcation used by municipalities to avoid liability and accountability must also be reexamined, alongside qualified immunity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Sarah Chanski is a JD\/PhD candidate at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law and Northwestern University School of Communication, and is Editor-in-Chief of Northwestern University Law Review.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Qualified immunity is getting a lot of well-deserved attention these days. The doctrine protects individual state actors\u2014and by extension, their government employers\u2014from liability when they have violated a constitutional right if that right was not \u201cclearly established in law.\u201d Protests over police brutality and demands for accountability have brought qualified immunity into the public spotlight. These conversations about individual accountability are important. But as necessary as they are, we cannot ignore the legal mechanisms for and barriers to institutional accountability&#8230;<\/p>\n<p class=\"read-more\"><a class=\"btn btn-default\" href=\"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?p=2547\"> Read More<span class=\"screen-reader-text\">  Read More<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":167,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2547","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p9jSvD-F5","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":2643,"url":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?p=2643","url_meta":{"origin":2547,"position":0},"title":"Overturning Qualified Immunity","author":"Emily Atseff","date":"April 12, 2022","format":false,"excerpt":"For decades, qualified immunity has been an evolving controversial legal doctrine. 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Medical professionals describe chaos in hospitals that makes it extremely difficult to treat all patients appropriately. Patients\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;COVID-19&quot;","block_context":{"text":"COVID-19","link":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?cat=122"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":403,"url":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?p=403","url_meta":{"origin":2547,"position":2},"title":"International Megan&#8217;s Law Raises Constitutional Concerns Over Sex Offender Rights","author":"Shafaq Hasan","date":"January 31, 2018","format":false,"excerpt":"In the last months of his presidency, former President Barack Obama focused on pushing forward criminal justice reform. Throughout his eight years in the Oval Office, he also prioritized\u00a0 \u201cbanning the box\u201d on federal job applications and reforming conditions in federal prisons. Given his dedication to criminal justice reform, some\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Board member contribution&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Board member contribution","link":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?cat=55"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogofnotesite.wpengine.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/01\/5899319369_e342439710_b-1024x472.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogofnotesite.wpengine.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/01\/5899319369_e342439710_b-1024x472.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogofnotesite.wpengine.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/01\/5899319369_e342439710_b-1024x472.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x"},"classes":[]},{"id":1495,"url":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?p=1495","url_meta":{"origin":2547,"position":3},"title":"Do Prisoners Have a Right to Soap?","author":"Chad Flanders","date":"June 24, 2020","format":false,"excerpt":"In the ongoing litigation regarding prison conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic, one request of the litigants stands out: they want more soap. And sometimes\u2014especially at the district court level\u2014prisoners have been able to get that soap. In a Texas case, Valentine v. Collier, the district court ordered the prison to\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Constitutional Issues&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Constitutional Issues","link":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?cat=134"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":1167,"url":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?p=1167","url_meta":{"origin":2547,"position":4},"title":"Accountability (or Lack Thereof) of Corporate Officers and Directors","author":"Cindy Schipani","date":"February 17, 2020","format":false,"excerpt":"The following piece is a part of NULR of Note's \u201cBring Back The \u201890s\u201d initiative, aimed at exploring the evolution of legal thinking over the past three decades. For more, click here. 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Rustad","date":"June 15, 2020","format":false,"excerpt":"Oh, the sun shines bright on my old Kentucky home\u2018Tis summer, the old folks are gayWhere the corn top\u2019s ripe and the meadow\u2019s in the bloomWhile the birds make music all the day Weep no more, my ladyOh, weep no more todayWe\u2019ll sing one songFor my old Kentucky homeFor my\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Congressional Responses&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Congressional Responses","link":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?cat=160"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2547","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/167"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=2547"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2547\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=2547"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=2547"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=2547"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}