{"id":1177,"date":"2020-02-17T01:43:08","date_gmt":"2020-02-17T07:43:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogofnotesite.wpengine.com\/?p=1177"},"modified":"2020-02-17T01:43:08","modified_gmt":"2020-02-17T07:43:08","slug":"update-on-confirmation-process","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?p=1177","title":{"rendered":"Update on Confirmation Process"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The following piece is a part of NULR of Note’s \u201cBring Back The \u201890s\u201d initiative, aimed at exploring the evolution of legal thinking over the past three decades. For more, <\/em>click here<\/em><\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
Photo by Claire Anderson<\/a> on Unsplash<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Writing in 1990<\/a>, not long after the conclusion of Robert Bork\u2019s Supreme Court confirmation hearings, I noted the growing\u2014although not uncontested\u2014consensus that senators should attempt to shape constitutional meaning by aggressively inquiring about the nominee\u2019s beliefs about interpretive methods, legal philosophy, doctrines, and even specific cases. I lamented the fact that in operation, this consensus resulted in enhanced influence for the legal professoriate over whether to consent to a nomination rather than potentially useful political advice to the nominee. In keeping with the claims of ascendant legal realism as well as the empirical findings of political scientists like Robert Dahl<\/a>, politicians were openly attempting to influence the Court\u2019s constitutional decision-making. They were doing so through legal predictions about likely votes on specific issues rather than by bringing to bear political information and judgment about the larger effects of the Court\u2019s role on our everyday lives, our institutions, and our culture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When the Bork nomination was rejected, intentional political influence over constitutional interpretation still seemed questionable because it is obviously in tension with the founding myth, famously enunciated in Marbury v. Madison<\/em><\/a> (1803), that the courts cannot enforce statutes that are inconsistent with the Constitution because the Constitution is itself a law that has superior status. To the extent that politics creates constitutional meaning, the American Constitution is not a written law but, like the British Constitution, a reflection of political practices and beliefs. However, unlike the tradition-based British Constitution, the American Constitution is to a significant degree a reflection of current majoritarian aspirations and preferences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Today a chorus of reverential appeals to our devotion to the \u201crule of law,\u201d and especially to the Constitution as our fundamental law, somehow coexists with what has become the accepted practice of a highly politicized and sophisticated process for selecting and confirming judicial nominees. Indeed, a comprehensive study by Keith Whittington<\/a>, published in 2019, concludes\u2014with some refinements and qualifications\u2014that Dahl<\/a> was right even in 1957 to say that the Supreme Court\u2019s constitutional decisions only rarely and briefly frustrate the will of engaged national majorities. The title of Whittington\u2019s monumental study, Repugnant Laws<\/em><\/a>, perfectly captures the deep dissonance in our attitudes about politicized law. Whittington chose the word \u201crepugnant\u201d because in Marbury<\/em><\/a>, Chief Justice John Marshall used the word to refer to statutes that conflict with the higher, written law. How nice that our current political preferences, at least as measured by national majorities, so often turn out to be consistent with determinations written into law decades and even centuries ago.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Many sophisticated ideas have been offered to explain this rather surprising state of affairs. Political partisans of all stripes tend to believe that their influence over the selection and confirmation process is consistent with constitutionalism because the interpretive philosophies that they champion lead to accurate or, at least, to morally correct interpretations of the original document. Deviations then occur when the Court is influenced by one\u2019s political opponents. Scholars, including both Dahl and Whittington, consider more serious explanations, including the possibility that the meaning of the original Constitution is sufficiently open to allow for a range of correct interpretations\u2014a plausible possibility but one that must be resisted by those who believe that a necessary characteristic of a \u201claw\u201d is that its meaning be ascertainable so that it is possible to conform one\u2019s behavior to its requirements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In any event, it is not entirely clear whether the selection and confirmation processes\u2014no matter how sophisticated\u2014are actually the explanation for the strange concordance between the political will of national majorities and the interpreted meaning of the Constitution. How a Justice will behave once on the high court is notoriously difficult to predict. Neither the Burger Court nor the Rehnquist Court behaved\u2014to put it mildly\u2014as conservative Republican sponsors had expected<\/a>. Despite the more thorough screening that has been in use in more recent years, other majoritarian and institutional influences may allow for important surprises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What does seem clear is that, while the character of modern confirmation hearings has varied depending on a range of factors, including the existing balance of power on the Court, the trend is ominous, especially for anyone who would prefer serious explorations of the Court\u2019s overall role and effects. Merrick Garland, of course, was denied any hearing at all, and both Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh endured highly politicized personal attacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ugly politics is, it appears, one of the consequences of the Court\u2019s inflated role in our political life. Perhaps that sobering fact\u2014that inadvertent piece of \u201cadvice\u201d\u2014will come home to the Justices from their experiences in the confirmation process. If so, their attention will necessarily be drawn past the academy\u2019s concentration on national majoritarianism to the Court\u2019s interference with political decision-making at the state and local level.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Robert F. Nagel is\nEmeritus Professor of Law at the University of Colorado School of Law. His\narticles have appeared in numerous academic journals as well as in the Wall\nStreet Journal, New Republic, Washington Monthly, Public Interest, and First\nThings. He is also a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts &\nSciences. <\/em><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The following piece is a part of NULR of Note’s \u201cBring Back The \u201890s\u201d initiative, aimed at exploring the evolution of legal thinking over the past three decades. For more, click here. Writing in 1990, not long after the conclusion of Robert Bork\u2019s Supreme Court confirmation hearings, I noted the growing\u2014although not uncontested\u2014consensus that senators should attempt to shape constitutional meaning by aggressively inquiring about the nominee\u2019s beliefs about interpretive methods, legal philosophy, doctrines, and even specific cases. I lamented…<\/p>\n

Read More Read More<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":83,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[56,43,1],"tags":[68],"class_list":["post-1177","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bring-back-the-90s","category-professor-contribution","category-uncategorized","tag-supreme-court"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p9jSvD-iZ","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":1114,"url":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?p=1114","url_meta":{"origin":1177,"position":0},"title":"Bring Back the ’90s","author":"Danielle Berkowsky","date":"February 17, 2020","format":false,"excerpt":"The following pieces are a part of Northwestern University Law Review Online Volume 114's \u201cBring Back The \u201890s\u201d initiative, aimed at exploring the evolution of legal thinking over the past three decades. Authors who published with NULR in the 1990s were provided with an opportunity to revisit the ideas, issues,\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Bring Back the '90s"","block_context":{"text":"Bring Back the '90s","link":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?cat=56"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/black-and-silver-cassette-player-159613.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/black-and-silver-cassette-player-159613.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/black-and-silver-cassette-player-159613.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/black-and-silver-cassette-player-159613.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/black-and-silver-cassette-player-159613.jpg?resize=1050%2C600&ssl=1 3x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/black-and-silver-cassette-player-159613.jpg?resize=1400%2C800&ssl=1 4x"},"classes":[]},{"id":1167,"url":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?p=1167","url_meta":{"origin":1177,"position":1},"title":"Accountability (or Lack Thereof) of Corporate Officers and Directors","author":"Cindy Schipani","date":"February 17, 2020","format":false,"excerpt":"The following piece is a part of NULR of Note's \u201cBring Back The \u201890s\u201d initiative, aimed at exploring the evolution of legal thinking over the past three decades. For more, click here. In assessing the liability of corporate actors, courts have fairly consistently resolved contests of doctrine in favor of\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Bring Back the '90s"","block_context":{"text":"Bring Back the '90s","link":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?cat=56"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/02\/hunters-race-MYbhN8KaaEc-unsplash.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/02\/hunters-race-MYbhN8KaaEc-unsplash.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/02\/hunters-race-MYbhN8KaaEc-unsplash.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/02\/hunters-race-MYbhN8KaaEc-unsplash.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/02\/hunters-race-MYbhN8KaaEc-unsplash.jpg?resize=1050%2C600&ssl=1 3x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/02\/hunters-race-MYbhN8KaaEc-unsplash.jpg?resize=1400%2C800&ssl=1 4x"},"classes":[]},{"id":1183,"url":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?p=1183","url_meta":{"origin":1177,"position":2},"title":"An Education Right Long Denied; An Education Crisis Thus Continues","author":"Susan Bitensky","date":"February 17, 2020","format":false,"excerpt":"The following piece is a part of NULR of Note's \u201cBring Back The \u201890s\u201d initiative, aimed at exploring the evolution of legal thinking over the past three decades. For more, click here. Photo by\u00a0Element5 Digital\u00a0on\u00a0Unsplash Most Americans would probably be surprised to discover that there is no right under the\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Bring Back the '90s"","block_context":{"text":"Bring Back the '90s","link":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?cat=56"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/element5-digital-OyCl7Y4y0Bk-unsplash-1.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/element5-digital-OyCl7Y4y0Bk-unsplash-1.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/element5-digital-OyCl7Y4y0Bk-unsplash-1.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/element5-digital-OyCl7Y4y0Bk-unsplash-1.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/element5-digital-OyCl7Y4y0Bk-unsplash-1.jpg?resize=1050%2C600&ssl=1 3x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/element5-digital-OyCl7Y4y0Bk-unsplash-1.jpg?resize=1400%2C800&ssl=1 4x"},"classes":[]},{"id":1135,"url":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?p=1135","url_meta":{"origin":1177,"position":3},"title":"Is it Only a Crime? 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Photo by\u00a0Emiliano Bar\u00a0on\u00a0Unsplash When I wrote\u00a0Isn\u2019t It a Crime: Feminist Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence\u00a0for the\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Bring Back the '90s"","block_context":{"text":"Bring Back the '90s","link":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?cat=56"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/emiliano-bar-PaKHbtTDqt0-unsplash.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/emiliano-bar-PaKHbtTDqt0-unsplash.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/emiliano-bar-PaKHbtTDqt0-unsplash.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/emiliano-bar-PaKHbtTDqt0-unsplash.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/emiliano-bar-PaKHbtTDqt0-unsplash.jpg?resize=1050%2C600&ssl=1 3x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/emiliano-bar-PaKHbtTDqt0-unsplash.jpg?resize=1400%2C800&ssl=1 4x"},"classes":[]},{"id":1127,"url":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?p=1127","url_meta":{"origin":1177,"position":4},"title":"The Historiographical Context of “Revisiting James Bradley Thayer”","author":"G. Edward White","date":"February 17, 2020","format":false,"excerpt":"The following piece is a part of NULR of Note's \u201cBring Back The \u201890s\u201d initiative, aimed at exploring the evolution of legal thinking over the past three decades. For more, click here. Photo by\u00a0Sebastian Pichler\u00a0on\u00a0Unsplash The 1993 Symposium in which Revisiting James Bradley Thayer appeared was prompted by the centennial\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Bring Back the '90s"","block_context":{"text":"Bring Back the '90s","link":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?cat=56"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/sebastian-pichler-bAQH53VquTc-unsplash.jpg?resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/sebastian-pichler-bAQH53VquTc-unsplash.jpg?resize=350%2C200 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/sebastian-pichler-bAQH53VquTc-unsplash.jpg?resize=525%2C300 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/sebastian-pichler-bAQH53VquTc-unsplash.jpg?resize=700%2C400 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/sebastian-pichler-bAQH53VquTc-unsplash.jpg?resize=1050%2C600 3x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/sebastian-pichler-bAQH53VquTc-unsplash.jpg?resize=1400%2C800 4x"},"classes":[]},{"id":1138,"url":"https:\/\/blog.northwesternlaw.review\/?p=1138","url_meta":{"origin":1177,"position":5},"title":"Role of Private Parties in Public Governance","author":"Harold Krent","date":"February 17, 2020","format":false,"excerpt":"The following piece is a part of NULR of Note's \u201cBring Back The \u201890s\u201d initiative, aimed at exploring the evolution of legal thinking over the past three decades. 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